There is a sense in which discussion today of empirically supported treatments (and psychopathology and assessment, one presumes) is almost quaint. After all, was not the scientistprofessional model of training at the very core of the earliest conception of clinical psychology following World War II? The ideal of the clinical (or more generally speaking, the professional or applied) psychologist has for at least the past half century been that of training the student and the professional to think like a scientist and to look to findings from controlled research for clues to understanding psychopathology and in devising and evaluating the most effective and most efficient interventions and assessments.
But we all know that this has not happened. The ratio of unbridled speculation and appeals to authority vis a vis anything we would call scientific data is very large indeed. And it is inaccurate and unfair to heap all of the blame on the professional school movement that began back in the 1960s when we feared a shortage of doctoral-level clinical psychologists. A disappointment that I believe most of us in avowedly Boulder model training programs share is that we often find ourselves spending time and effort teaching our students intervention and assessment procedures and approaches that lack empirical justification or are, at best, inefficient ways to gather information and design humane and effective interventions. It is for this reason-the fact that our scientist-professional rhetoric outdistances our training and educational practices-that the efforts of Division 12 of the American Psychological Association (APA) are timely and welcome (Crits-Christoph, Frank, Chambless, Brody, & Karp, 1995 ; Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures, 1995) . No doubt the chances of future success are enhanced by the availability in the late 1990s
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gerald C. Davison of a variety of interventions that have been investigated in controlled outcome and process studies. As a consequence of this empirical study, explicit and detailed treatment manuals are available that have not only defined the independent variables in research but constitute useful instructional tools for the education of our future colleagues as well as for the in-service training of those of us who are not familiar with these findings and associated treatment materials.
Calhoun, Moras, Pilkonis, and Rehm (1998) laid out clearly and effectively many of the advantages and challenges inherent in the availability of empirically supported treatments (ESTs) with respect to graduate education. I have some reactions to some of what they put forth, along with some elaborations and extensions of several of their points.
Eschewing Unverified Procedures
There are hurdles to bringing ESTs into our training programs. Courses are sometimes retained out of deference to tradition or to the special interests of a colleague. It can be awkward interpersonally and politically to try to shift course and practicum offerings to approaches and procedures that enjoy more empirical support than what some clinical faculty have been doing for years and believe to be effective, especially when one is dealing with tenured (and respected) faculty. This has to be done, however, if we are to be true to our scientist-professional heritage as most recently articulated at the Gainesville Conference (Belar & Perry, 1992 ence-based approaches, one that may be even more inhibiting than the sensibilities of some clinical faculty. I am referring to requirements set by many internship settings that students have x hours of experience administering y kinds of intervention or, more likely, assessment, that, in the view of many academic faculty, lack empirical justification. This situation is a problem especially in the current crunch-crisis, really-that sees numerous (perhaps hundreds of) doctoral students from APA-approved clinical programs without a placement on notification day. Under these circumstances, it is daunting to do anything in our pre-internship education that would reduce our students' chances of obtaining a clinical internship. 2 The concern is legitimate even if student anxieties such as these are based more on perception than reality. And yet how can progress be made in approaching the realization of psychology in practice being an application of empirical principles unless at some point we convince our valued internship colleagues that, instead of hours of experience with an unvalidated technique, our students will bring with them not only a readiness and ability to learn but a set of problem-solving skills, a commitment to scholarship and rigorous thinking, and a knowledge base that can enrich the internship setting itself at the same time they obtain the essential advanced clinical training provided by internships? 3
Problems in Empirical Paradise
I see two problems with the juggernaut of ESTs and their associated advocacy of treatment manuals as a mainstay of training, and Calhoun et al. (1998) addressed both in a commendable fashion: the relative neglect of idiographic study of the individual patient , and the de-emphasis on the heuristic and creative aspects of what Lazarus and I have called clinical innovation (Davison & Lazarus, 1994 Lazarus & Davison, 1971) .
It has been argued that actuarial or statistical prediction is superior to idiographic case formulations (e.g., Dawes, 1994; Meehl, 1954; Wilson, in press) , but this position is not universally agreed on by other research-oriented clinicians (e.g., Persons, 1989) . In this regard, Goldfried and I recently voiced the following caution about what we termed the double-edged sword of treatment manuals, in particular with regard to their training implications:
Although there is much to be said for detailed specification of one's intervention, the nature of research methodology dictates that these typically orientation-based interventions for treating presumably homogeneous DSM categories are implemented with clients who have been assigned to the treatment on a random basis. What clearly is lost in this process is the crucial need for case formulation prior to any intervention, a point that we have underscored . . . as central to rational and effective therapy. The tendency to use these treatment manuals-designed primarily for use in controlled outcome studies-to train practicing clinicians conveys to beginning therapists that a given prepackaged intervention can be used with any patient having a particular DSM diagnosis. This is not the way clinicians work [or should work] in the real world. Fortunately, practicing therapists are now voicing their concerns about the indiscriminate use of therapy manuals, underscoring the central role of assessment and case formulation (Persons, 1989) . (Goldfried & Davison, 1994, p. 292) My concern is that, especially at the stage of training our graduate students, teaching from and to a treatment manual may have a meaning and significance different from what holds for more experienced clinicians (who, after all, are the ones writing the manuals and arguing for their centrality in both training and research). For one thing, it is impossible to talk about ESTs without reference to the clinical problems for which they are suited. And research practice in recent years has married the manuals to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental-Disorders (DSM) diagnoses, something which is hard to reconcile with the functional analysis that is the mainstay of experimental thinking and practices. (In this article, I am not equating ESTs with cognitive behavior therapy [CBT] nor does CBT have hegemony over functional analysis, which is neither more nor less than a careful and thorough determination of the variables of which a target of interest is a function.) Said differently, there are many different reasons that a given patient may be depressed, anxious, aggressive, schizophrenic, borderline disordered, and so on.
Though more explicit and operational than their predecessors, the third and fourth editions of the DSM are categorical systems according to which heterogeneous clinical problems are designated as belonging to a very small number of categories that fall short of defining the variables of which the clinical problem is a function. For example, one person's major depression might be a function primarily of a poor social support network, another's a function more of distortions in thinking, still another's a reaction to a biochemical imbalance, or some combination of all three parameters. Randomized clinical trials (RCTs), the mainstay of psychotherapy research and the forum in which ESTs have developed, can lose sight of these differences. To be sure, some researchers have been examining these complexities (see Wilson, in press , for an informative review), but one recent and arguably the most ambitious attempt (unsuccessful) thus far to show an aptitude-treatment interaction. Project MATCH, has not provided data that can serve as a reliable guide to differential treatment assignment (Project MATCH, 1997). Calhoun et al.'s (1998) cautions about treatment manuals are well-taken and well-stated, especially in their description of what they call second generation or theory-driven treatment approaches, and one hopes that this complexity is not missed in the 2 A more basic issue, which is beyond the scope of this article, is the current and future employment prospects of graduates of our programs.
Cutbacks in mental health funding, both for service and for training, and changes in the health care system, no doubt contribute to this current worrisome situation. Some clinical programs are intentionally reducing the numbers of students they admit. Others are finding that admissions are being constrained by reductions in both external and internal financial support for students. Whatever the causes, it is obvious at this time that there are far too few internship slots for the numbers of clinical and counseling doctoral students seeking such placements.
3 An additional concern of the more research-oriented clinical/counseling programs is the sheer number of pre-internship supervised hours that are being required or recommended by many internship sites. Many of our doctoral students feel compelled-understandably so-to accumulate upwards of 3,000 practicum hours to give themselves the extra edge they believe they need in the current competitive environment.
What gets sacrificed are time and energy that can be devoted to research and other scholarly activities.
rush towards making ESTs a mainstay of our training programs. Although treatment manuals can provide a useful conceptual and procedural framework for intervention, one hopes that they do not rum into rigid formulas that are applied without due consideration of the idiographics of the person or group one is working with. Indeed, if one truly appreciates how they developed and if one accepts the need for continuing evaluation and refinement, they will not be seen as static and formulaic, a point recently emphasized by Wilson (in press The other problem in empirical paradise concerns clinical innovation. Not given due consideration in our enthusiasm for ESTs are the innovative and creative aspects of clinical work. ESTs, like other aspects of science, require a measure of artistry in their creation and implementation. Their very existence, as well as their evolution, is based on more than psychological findings or principles. As Lazarus and I argued some time ago, The clinician in fact approaches his work with a given set, a framework for ordering the complex data that are his domain. But frameworks are insufficient. The clinician, like any other applied scientist, must fill out the theoretical skeleton. Individual cases present problems that always call for knowledge beyond basic psychological principles [italics added]. (Lazarus & Davison, 1971, p. 203) In our scientific literature, the role of creative insights and intellectual risk-taking is seldom emphasized as much as the controlled testing of disconfirmable hypotheses. The increase in structure that ESTs and their associated manuals can give to clinical work and instruction should not lead us to lose sight of the limits of our knowledge and of the need to remain open to new ideas, some of which may well come from domains outside the boundary conditions defined by our ESTs.
I am mindful of an apparent inconsistency between this suggestion and my earlier brief against the teaching of unvalidated approaches. Perhaps a reasonable position is that the continuing presence of the latter in our curricula and, I believe, hi the requirements of many internship settings could stand a major correction. I am in no way suggesting, however, that only validated approaches be taught if by doing so we discourage the land of clinical innovation and experimentation that is as critical to further progress as is the mastery of strategies and techniques that enjoy empirical support. There is a compelling dialectic between what we believe we know, incarnated in EST manuals, and what we are pretty certain we do not know, incarnated in the variance in outcomes. Consider that some patients in experimental treatment conditions do not get better, some get worse, and some show improvements that fall short of those in some who are in contrasting control groups-a fact of our scientific life that is often lost when group differences command our attention in RCTs (see Davison & Lazarus, 1994, pp. 165-166 , for an extended discussion of the limits of RCTs).
Postdoctoral Clinical Training
Regarding postdoctoral training in empirically supported treatments, the article by Calhoun et al. (1998) brings to mind a conference held more than 25 years ago at the Menninger Rmndation. Among the presentations was a report I made on the postdoctoral program in behavior therapy that was begun at Stony Brook by Leonard Krasner in 1966 and which I directed for a number of years. The philosophy and the mechanics of that program have been described in two publications (Davison & Goldfried, 1973; Davison, Goldfried, & Krasner, 1970) .
One of the principal themes of our reports was that the very nature of behavior therapy as applied experimental psychology rendered an academic department of psychology a particularly appropriate place to house such a program. Clinical supervision by full-time clinical faculty helped ensure that the clinical learning of the postdoctoral fellows was tied to the evolving scientific evidence. Emphasis was on both the substantive and philosophical links between this particular approach to clinical assessment and intervention, and the methodologies and values of the less applied areas of psychology.
Although the set defined as EST encompasses more than (cognitive) behavior therapy, the set that defines (cognitive) behavior therapy is contained-at least rhetorically-within the larger set of EST. Our earlier examination of the Stony Brook postdoctoral program in behavior therapy, then, is pertinent to today's discussions. These articles addressed most of the questions outlined and discussed by Calhoun et al. (1998) vis a vis postdoctoral training, most especially the need for direct observation of EST conducted by experienced therapists, in contrast to the more usual (I believe) practice of reviewing a supervisee's case notes in one's office.
Assessment for What?
Expert competence must include the ability to assess patients' suitability for an empirically supported treatment. This implies the importance of idiographic assessment of a patient, an assessment mat, in the best behavioral tradition as laid out originally by Walter Mischel thirty years ago (Mischel, 1968) and elaborated in a more clinical vein by myself (Goldfried & Davison, 1976, 1994) , is tied to decisions about intervention. Indeed, so intimate is this link that, in my own academic-clinical experience at Stony Brook and at the University of Southern California, I have argued with my colleagues, with varying success, that, unless they can be taught simultaneously, the basic course in intervention should precede the basic course in assessment. This is, I suspect, an unusual arrangement in most of our educational experiences, including my own, but it has always made the best sense to me. Unless one's idea of assessment is administering a standard test battery (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Rorschach, and perhaps one or two other proprietary instruments) and then writing up a report that may end with a recommendation for ' 'psychotherapy," one needs to know the therapeutic options available for the patient while one is gathering information about him or her. Such information might, for example, concern the presence of certain cognitive biases or schemata, important in judging the patient's suitability for a cognitive therapy.
Assessment information might also pertain to the patient's ability to satisfy the procedural requirements of a particular technique. For example, if an anxious person cannot become upset by imagining a fearsome situation, it would make no sense to plan a course of systematic desensitization, for the overall procedural goal of desensitization is to have the patient imagine his or her most frightening situation without becoming anxious, being enabled to do so by means of graduated exposure coupled with anxiety-inhibiting relaxation (Wolpe, 1958) . (Forward generalization decrement of anxiety from easier aversive images renders those higher on the anxiety hierarchy less fearsome.) Someone who cannot conjure up an image that is functionally equivalent in aversiveness to real life is already at the top of his or her anxiety hierarchy, so there would be no point in using desensitization in imagination. Other examples are legion. My point is that any discussion of ESTs should and, I would propose, must include a similar examination of empirically supported assessments, an effort that is being launched by Division 12 and is already in progress under the auspices of the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy.
Continuing Education-A Messy Challenge Calhoun et al. (1998) were certainly correct to argue for the critical importance of continuing education (CE) both in bringing EST expertise to those already working professionally and in helping working professionals remain au courant with what we hope will be a cumulative science of therapeutic change. But the CE situation is chaotic, in my opinion. The clearest outcome of the push for CE is, I believe, that a small number of people are making a great deal of money giving 1-or 2-day workshops to psychologists who are being increasingly required by state licensing bodies to accumulate CE credits.
Although many offerings are science-based, reporting the best of what is available from the clinical research literature, the substance of others is, I would suggest, driven more by theoretical and professional allegiances than by a critical evaluation of controlled research efforts. If I may be allowed a personal anecdote, I recall sitting for a long Saturday some years ago listening to several clinicians telling me, among other things, that one should always assume (not explore, but assume) sexual abuse when a child has trouble sleeping, is afraid to go to school, and is shy around both peers and adults. About the only problem not declared to be a sign of sexual abuse was tartar build-up. My example is partially facetious (though not far from the reality I endured along with about 300 other people that day) but the point is very serious. Quality control in CE is, in my view, nonexistent.
The problem may be particularly acute for ESTs. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and the purchase of a manual even if one is fortunate enough to be exposed to it in a workshop by a recognized expert, perhaps even the developer of the approach, is a far cry from achieving even minimal mastery of a given EST, as Calhoun et al. (1998) stated. It can be argued that the one thing that is worse than knowing nothing about something important is to believe incorrectly that one knows something about it. I'm afraid that the CE workshop formatincluding the cursory state-mandated ' 'tests'' that one must pass at the close of each offering-falls short of achieving the commendable goal of bringing new functional knowledge to people in the field.
Learning a therapy that one is ignorant of or only marginally familiar with can be a challenge to someone who has had a professional degree for 20 years and has amassed many times more contact hours of therapy than the workshop presenter. The workshop leader has little leverage over the participants to do the reading, practice techniques, or obtain supervision. Until and unless third party payers require ESTs and/or until state licensing bodies get serious about competence-based training, I do not have much optimism about the CE enterprise as a suitably rigorous and effective mode of education and training.
Conclusion
Clinical psychology and allied mental health disciplines are at a crossroads. The move towards listing and encouraging instruction in empirically supported techniques reflects a growing belief that our science of therapeutic change has matured sufficiently to permit such "top-down" professional pressure. We psychologists, though, can be a cantankerous and skeptical lot. We learned to critique articles published even in the most prestigious of journals, to view pronouncements of what is true or valid with a jaundiced eye, to question authority, and to be continually on the look-out for conceptual, methodological, and statistical flaws in everything we read, say, and write. This scientific stance has been extremely beneficial for our evolving science and science-based practice. What I mean by a bolder Boulder model in the title of this article is that it is time, in my view, to take more seriously than we have hitherto the applied implications of what many of us think we know about therapeutic change (and about psychopathology and assessment, of course). If approaches and procedures that have been around for a long time still lack the kind of empirical support that some significant segment of us can agree is legitimate to require of them, then it is time to be more forceful and more assertive in bringing our teaching and therapeutic practices more in line with the science. Continue to argue the science, of course, and that is consistent with the Boulder model. But it would appear to be time to be bolder about the model, as argued in the Calhoun et ai. (1998) article as well as in the present commentary on it.
